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Contextual Strict Scrutiny and
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Angelo N. Ancheta*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his oft-cited article analyzing the United States Supreme Court's
Equal Protection jurisprudence of the 1960s and early 1970s, Professor
Gerald Gunther proposed that the Court's most exacting standard of
judicial review reflected a "scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact."' The Court's review of laws based on suspect classifications,
such as race or national origin, and laws infringing on fundamental
rights, including the right to vote, demonstrated that strict scrutiny
would prove lethal to a statute challenged on Equal Protection grounds.
In particular, the Court's evaluation of laws that subordinated minority
groups-including school segregation policies, discriminatory public
accommodations and transportation laws, and anti-miscegenation
statutes prohibiting interracial marriages-consistently led to the
invalidation of racial classifications. 2
Recent challenges to race-conscious policies, including laws designed
to remedy discrimination and to expand opportunities for racial
minorities, have confirmed the rigor of strict scrutiny. In City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.3 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia,4 the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny must be applied to all
racial classifications regardless of whether the policies subordinate
* Director of Legal and Advocacy Programs, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University;
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law.
1. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing anti-miscegenation laws);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (discussing segregation in local bus system),
affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Mayor of Bait. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (discussing segregation in public beaches and bathhouses), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (eliminating school segregation).
3. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
4. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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minorities, remedy past discrimination, or promote the inclusion of
minorities in civic life.5 The federal courts have addressed an array of
race-conscious policies in recent years, including affirmative action
programs in employment, education, and contracting; race-conscious
legislative districting designed to empower minority voters; and
voluntary efforts to address racial isolation in public schools. 6  In most
of these cases, courts have found these laws and policies to be
unconstitutional.7
Yet, in the Supreme Court's most recent affirmative action cases
involving challenges to race-conscious admissions at the University of
Michigan, the Court reaffirmed its earlier pronouncement in the
Adarand case that, while strict in theory, strict scrutiny is not invariably
fatal in fact.8 Context matters in strict scrutiny analysis, and within the
context of evaluating an inclusive admissions policy in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Supreme Court applied a more relaxed version of strict
scrutiny to uphold the consideration of race in selective university
admissions. 9  In doing so, the Court deferred to the University's
5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), and finding that the highly suspect nature of racial
classifications mandates strict scrutiny regardless of the race of those burdened or benefited).
6. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that a state's race-based
congressional redistricting plan was not narrowly tailored to promote the compelling interest
created by the Voting Rights Act); Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city ordinance
that required at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each city contract to be awarded to
minority-owned subcontractors); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (stating that "societal
discrimination is insufficient and over expansive" to justify the use of racial classification in a
school district's layoff policy); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th
Cir. 2001) (striking down a university's admission policy that awarded a fixed numerical bonus to
non-white applicants); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999)
(stopping a public school from using a weighted lottery in its admission process to promote racial
and ethnic diversity in its student body), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).
7. Recent exceptions to the federal courts' pattern of striking down race-conscious policies
include Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999)
(upholding race-conscious admissions policy for university-based elementary school designed to
promote interest in educational research), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000), and Wittmer v.
Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the use of race preferences in a non-remedial
employment policy of prison guards), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
8. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (stating that "[a]lthough all
governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it"); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (implying that some racial classifications may withstand
strict scrutiny).
9. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (stating that "[nlot every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision-maker for the
use in that particular context").
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judgment in that the University had a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body and upheld the use of race as a 'plus' among many
factors employed in a flexible admissions process. Strict scrutiny may
be strict in theory, but it is contextual in practice.' 0
While illuminating the boundaries for race-conscious policies in
higher education, the rulings in the University of Michigan cases shed
only partial light on the more general questions of when and how
context affects strict scrutiny. If, as the Grutter analysis implies, courts
may on occasion employ more deferential versions of strict scrutiny,
what contexts determine such occasions? Was the Court's contextual
scrutiny in Grutter specific to higher education when the Court deferred
to policy making that was associated with academic freedoms rooted in
the First Amendment?11 Or, was context grounded in a distinction
between exclusionary and subordinative legislation on the one hand and
inclusionary and integrative policies on the other-a distinction that the
Court ostensibly rejected in Croson and Adarand when it ruled that both
"invidious" and "benign" racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny? 12 Or, is context to be addressed on an ad hoc, case-by-case
basis? Moreover, assuming that context properly determines the rigor
of strict scrutiny, how should courts customize their analyses to fit a
given context?
Strict scrutiny focuses on both the ends as well as the means
employed in a racial classification, and courts engage in two related
inquiries, either of which can lead to a holding of unconstitutionality. 13
First, the court must ask whether the underlying goal of a policy
constitutes a compelling governmental interest of sufficient importance
to justify the use of race. 14 Second, if the interest is indeed compelling,
the court must inquire into whether the policy is "narrowly tailored" to
fit its underlying goal. 15 Should the court adjust these inquiries to
accommodate contextual differences, and if so, how should such
inquiries be adjusted?
This Article analyzes recent case law applying strict scrutiny to racial
classifications and offers a set of principles to guide a contextual review
of race-conscious policy making. Part II reviews the basic elements of
10. Id.
11. See id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Law
School's use of race in admissions is "not entitled to any sort of deference, grounded in the First
Amendment or anywhere else").
12. Id. at 326.
13. Id. at 326-27.
14. Id. at 326.
15. Id.
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strict scrutiny and the Supreme Court's rulings in Adarand and Grutter,
where the Court advanced the contextual review of race-conscious
affirmative action policies.1 6  Part III examines federal case law in
which courts have engaged in contextual analyses of racial
classifications and discusses both the uses and limitations of these
analyses. 17 Part IV proposes a model of contextual strict scrutiny that
examines legislative intent and purpose, governmental role, institutional
prerogatives, historical deference, and the nature of a policy in order to
determine the context and the appropriate scrutiny of race-conscious
policies. 18  Finally, this Article concludes with the application of
contextual analysis to a set of education-related policies.
19
II. STRICT SCRUTINY AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS IN
ADARAND AND GRUTTER
The Supreme Court's three-tiered framework of judicial review 20
retains its force in equal protection jurisprudence, but Grutter and other
recent cases demonstrate that the framework is actually more fluid.
Contextual analyses, rather than an adherence to a more rigid multi-
tiered approach, may become the Court's model in future cases. This
Part provides an overview of strict scrutiny analysis and the contextual
model developed in the Adarand and Grutter cases.
A. Strict Scrutiny Principles
1. Overview
Because of America's long history of racial discrimination,
government race-based classifications are inherently suspect and
demand careful and exacting analysis by the courts. Since its
beginning, strict scrutiny has been a vehicle by which courts uncover
illicit motives behind laws that appear to promote legitimate
16. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of strict scrutiny and its application in Adarand
and Grutter).
17. See infra Part III (reviewing the application of varying forms of strict scrutiny analysis to
racial classifications in different contexts).
18. See infra Part IV.A (proposing an analytical model to improve the strict scrutiny analysis
by including more emphasis on context).
19. See infra Part IV.B (applying contextual strict scrutiny to a variety of race-conscious
education policies).
20. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-78 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (elucidating the
differences between heightened scrutiny analysis and rational basis analysis). Specifically, the
Supreme Court employs one of three analyses: (1) strict scrutiny of racial and other suspect
classifications; (2) intermediate-level scrutiny of gender and other "semi-suspect" classifications;
or (3) rational basis scrutiny of most other classifications. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 24 2004-2005
2004] Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy 25
governmental interests but are actually motivated by discriminatory
animus. 2' Because of the harms associated with racial classifications,
including group subordination and stereotyping, governments must
demonstrate the necessity of using a race-conscious policy. Thus, strict
scrutiny requires courts to carefully assess both the means and the ends
of a racial classification: A policy must be narrowly tailored to
effectively advance a compelling interest. Courts balance the
competing interests of the government and racial groups under strict
scrutiny, but because of the rarity of compelling justifications and the
stringency of narrow tailoring, strict scrutiny tips the balance strongly in
favor of plaintiffs successfully challenging a racial classification.
Courts typically incorporate multiple inquiries into the two prongs of
the strict scrutiny analysis. Under the compelling interest test, courts
focus on both the importance of the government interest and the
evidentiary basis for that interest. 22 The Supreme Court has recognized,
for instance, that a government entity can have a compelling interest in
remedying the present effects of its own past discrimination which
would thereby justify a racial classification. 23  However, a
governmental entity must also establish a factual predicate in support of
its compelling interest in remedying discrimination. In other words, an
interest in remediation cannot simply be asserted; there must be "a
strong basis in evidence" to show that there has been past
discrimination, as well as a showing that the present effects of the
discrimination requires race-conscious remediation measures. 24  As a
method of uncovering true governmental motives, the heavy evidentiary
burden ensures that the government is seeking genuine remedial goals,
21. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Croson to emphasize that
"'[absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for ... race-based measures,' [the
Court] has no way to determine what 'classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics"'); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that "[t]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race").
22. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 401-10 (1998) (discussing how
the Supreme Court makes a "compelling interest" inquiry based on substantive policy judgments
and then focuses on the evidentiary basis of that interest in order to uncover racial classification
schemes created from unconstitutional motives).
23. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (discussing the remedying of past
discrimination as a compelling interest that justifies racial classifications).
24. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (reaffirming Wygant and finding no strong basis in evidence);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that in
cases where a remedial action is challenged by a non-minority, "the trial court must make a
factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary").
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rather than an unconstitutional goal such as racial balancing, which
simply seeks racial proportionality for proportionality's sake.
While there is no single test for narrow tailoring, courts frequently
turn to a set of inquiries established by the Supreme Court plurality in
United States v. Paradise, a case in which the Court upheld a court-
ordered promotions quota designed to remedy extensive racial
discrimination in the Alabama Department of Public Safety. 25 Applied
in remedial cases, the Paradise factors focus on the following: (1) "the
necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternate remedies,"
particularly race-neutral alternatives; (2) "the flexibility and duration of
the relief"; (3) "the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant
market"; and (4) "the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties. '"26 Courts weigh all of these factors, and any significant
departure from the standards, such as insufficient flexibility, the
availability of a viable race-neutral alternative, or an undue burden on
third parties, can render a racial classification unconstitutional.
In addition, Supreme Court pluralities have articulated narrow
tailoring guidelines in cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education and City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., in which the
Justices required that race-conscious remedial programs have a "logical
stopping point" at which the remedy is complete and where the race-
conscious policy can therefore end.27 The Croson plurality also
inquired into the potential over-inclusiveness of a remedial policy as an
element of narrow tailoring. 28  For example, a race-conscious
contracting program that includes Asian-Americans, Pacific Islanders,
and Latinos as beneficiaries can be over-inclusive if those groups have
only recently entered the contracting market, and the remedy need only
address past discrimination against African-Americans.
29
25. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (pluraliy opinion).
26. Id. at 171 (plurality opinion). Although originally applied to labor markets, the Paradise
factors are often adjusted based on the facts of the case; for example in a case involving
educational admissions, a court may treat the potential applicant pool of students as the relevant
market. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706-07 (4th Cir. 1999)
(adopting the Paradise factors and adjusting them to fit the facts of a K-12 educational
admissions case), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).
27. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion).
28. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (stating that "[tihe gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial
preference strongly impugns the city's claim of remedial motivation").
29. See id. (stating that "[tihe random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter,
may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests
that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination").
[Vol. 36
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2. Triggering Strict Scrutiny
Although the Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny should be
applied to all racial classifications resulting in unequal treatment, not
every governmental consideration of race will trigger strict scrutiny. As
discussed in Part III below, courts have not applied strict scrutiny to
certain categories of legislation because of traditional deference to other
branches of government or because of the nature of the legislation. 30 In
the area of Native American policy, for instance, heightened judicial
review has not been invoked for classifications based on Native
American ancestry because courts have recognized the political
relationship of Native Americans to the federal government, and have
deferred to congressional prerogatives involving tribal relations. 31
In the area of legislative districting, a field in which policy makers
who draw political boundaries typically examine an array of political
and demographic factors, the Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny
is not automatically triggered when race is a factor. Race is an
unavoidable consideration in districting, particularly because districting
bodies must include race in their calculations to comply with the
Federal Voting Rights Act. 32  Race must instead be the predominant
factor in drawing district boundaries before courts invoke strict
scrutiny. 33
In addition, when racial considerations do not result in unequal
treatment-clear examples include gathering racial data for research
purposes or to document patterns of discrimination-strict scrutiny is
not triggered, as the consideration of race is not directly related to the
allocation of burdens or benefits. 34  In essence, if there is no unequal
treatment of individuals or of groups, there is no cognizable injury
resulting from a consideration of race that would trigger strict scrutiny.
30. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the categorical deference generally employed by the
Supreme Court in strict scrutiny cases as well as what triggers the strict scrutiny analysis).
31. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (citing several cases to establish that
Native Americans have long held a unique relationship with the Federal Government, and to
reject the application of heightened judicial review to this particular class).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000 & West Supp. 2004). As the Supreme Court clarified in Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995), "[r]edistricting legislatures will.., almost always be aware
of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process."
33. See infra Part II.B (emphasizing how race must be the predominant factor, rather than one
of many factors, in cases to trigger the strict scrutiny analysis).
34. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (2000) (discussing how
uses of race that are unrelated to the distribution of benefits or burdens do not trigger strict
scrutiny so long as there is a legitimate justification for the race-conscious measure).
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B. Adarand and the Roots of Contextual Scrutiny
In its 1995 ruling in Adarand Constructors v. Pefla, the Supreme
Court articulated three principles that guide its analysis of racial
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause and under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause: skepticism, consistency, and
congruence.35 Skepticism directs courts to be highly wary of race-based
classifications and to review such classifications with the most exacting
scrutiny. 36  Consistency requires courts to examine all racial
classifications under the same standard of review, regardless of the race
of the group that the classification benefits or burdens.37 Congruence
mandates that the same analysis be applied under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, federal classifications are subject to
the same equal protection standards as applied to state and local
classifications. 38  According to the Adarand Court, "[t]aken together,
these three propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting
that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." 39
By ruling that a race-conscious affirmative action plan designed to
remedy discrimination in federal contracting would be subject to strict
scrutiny, the Adarand Court cast aside its 1990 ruling in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,4° in which the Court applied a lower,
intermediate level of scrutiny to uphold a federal program designed to
promote racial diversity in broadcasting.4 1  Applying the congruency
principle, the Adarand Court elevated the standard of review for federal
35. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995).
36. Id. at 223 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)
(plurality opinion) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger,
C.J.)).
37. Id. at 224 (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(plurality opinion) and Regents of the University of California. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
38. Id. at 224 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
39. Id.
40. Metro Bradcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
41. Id. at 564-65. Holding that:
[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those measures are
not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past
[governmental or societal] discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the
extent that they serve important governmental objectives [within the power of
Congress] and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
[Vol. 36
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racial classifications to strict scrutiny.42  In doing so, the Court
underscored its earlier opinions in Wygant and Croson, holding that
even benign racial classifications designed to benefit racial minorities
are subject to strict scrutiny.43
Nevertheless, in addressing the dissenting Justices' concern that
invoking strict scrutiny would sound a death toll for race-conscious
affirmative action programs, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Adarand clarified that strict scrutiny is not always fatal in fact, noting,
"[tihe unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects
of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.".44  "[T]he point of strict scrutiny," Justice O'Connor
added, "is to 'differentiate between' permissible and impermissible
governmental use of race." 45
The Adarand majority further emphasized that courts can consider
contextual differences in a strict scrutiny analysis. 46 Justice O'Connor
stated:
[S]trict scrutiny does take 'relevant differences' into account-indeed,
that is its fundamental purpose. The point of carefully examining the
interest asserted by the government in support of a racial
classification, and the evidence offered to show that the classification
is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses
of race in governmental decision making. 47
42. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225. "[M]ore than good motives should be required when
government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification system." Id.
(quoting Drew S. Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987)).
43. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(stating that "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial'
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(noting that unless the trial court makes a determination that the employer has a strong basis in
evidence for a remedial action, a reviewing court "cannot determine whether the race-based
action is justified as a remedy for prior discrimination").
44. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
45. Id. at 228 (emphasizing that strict scrutiny does distinguish between invidious and benign
discrimination).
46. See id. at 237 (dispelling the notion that strict scrutiny disqualifies the government from
using race-based action to combat discrimination).
47. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original). Responding directly to Justice Stevens' criticism that the
consistency principle would fail to recognize any meaningful differences between classifications
that subordinate racial minorities and classifications that benefit racial minorities, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
[A]ccording to Justice Stevens, our view of consistency "equate[s] remedial
preferences with invidious discrimination," . . . and ignores the difference between "an
engine of oppression" and an effort "to foster equality in society," or, more colorfully,
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Because the Supreme Court remanded Adarand and did not itself
evaluate the policy under a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court did not
elaborate as to how relevant differences might affect the strict scrutiny
analysis. Yet, it is clear from the majority opinion that context is highly
relevant to an evaluation of a racial classification. Both benign and
invidious classifications are subject to the same basic requirements of
strict scrutiny in that they must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest; however, courts can take into account the
differences in the government's purpose and motive when applying the
strict scrutiny analysis.
C. Contextual Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger
Absent the specific application of strict scrutiny to the facts in
Adarand, the Supreme Court's consideration of race-conscious
admissions policies in the University of Michigan cases, Grutter v.
Bollinger48 and Gratz v. Bollinger,49 provided the first setting for the
Court's application of a strict scrutiny analysis under a framework in
which the principles of consistency and congruence were to be applied
to all racial classifications.
1. Grutter and Gratz
In the companion cases of Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Justice Powell's controlling opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 50 which held that race can be
employed as a plus factor in a flexible admissions process designed to
promote a university's interest in achieving a diverse student body. 5 1
Strongly asserting the value of diversity and racial integration in
American education, the Grutter Court laid to rest any doubts about
whether a university's interest in obtaining a diverse student body is
compelling and, along with the Gratz Court, established the boundaries
for narrowly tailored admissions policies. 52
"between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat." It does nothing of the kind.
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the government treats any
person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls
squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection. It says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that
determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.
Id. at 229-30 (citations omitted).
48. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
50. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51. Id. at 314-15 (opinion of Powell, J.).
52. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (reaffirming Bakke to find that "the Law School has a
[Vol. 36
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In Grutter, the Court upheld the Law School admissions policy at the
University of Michigan, a review process in which race is considered as
one of several factors, including grades, standardized test scores,
individual background, and life and work experiences. Relying on
Bakke's prohibition of quotas and separate tracks for minority
applicants and adapting narrow tailoring guidelines from Paradise, the
Court concluded the following: (1) that the Law School policy was
flexible and did not employ inappropriate quotas or separate application
tracks; (2) that no workable race-neutral alternatives were available; (3)
that non-minority applicants were not unduly burdened by the policy;
and (4) that the policy was properly subject to time limits because of the
administration's periodic review of the policy. 53  However, in
evaluating the University of Michigan's undergraduate policy -a policy
that automatically assigned twenty out of a possible total of 150 points
to each underrepresented minority applicant-the Gratz Court
concluded that the automatic assignment of points as a racial advantage
would practically guarantee admission to minority students and, further,
that the policy lacked the necessary flexibility to be sufficiently
narrowly tailored.54 Together, the decisions signal that an admissions
policy, to pass constitutional muster, should be based on the
individualized consideration of applicants and should flexibly employ
race as one factor among many.
55
The University of Michigan decisions established clear guidance on
admissions policies, but the Court's strict scrutiny analysis in Grutter
also developed important equal protection principles that are applicable
to an array of racial classifications both within and outside of higher
education. First, in upholding the University's interest in maintaining
student body diversity, the Court clarified that an interest in remedying
past discrimination is not the only governmental interest that can be
compelling interest in a diverse student body," which is "at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a
showing to the contrary"'). See also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (finding that the undergraduate point
system "is not narrowly tailored to achieve [the] asserted compelling interest in diversity").
53. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-43.
54. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-76. It is not clear, however, if the Court's ruling was predicated
specifically on the inflexibility of the admissions policy or on the heavy weighting of race, which
in the Court's view, almost ensured admission for minority students. Id. at 271-72.
55. See id. at 270 (stating that "[w]e find that the University's policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve
the interest in educational diversity"). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that the Law
School's highly individualized admissions process is sufficiently flexible to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement derived from the Equal Protection Clause).
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constitutionally compelling. 56  The Court thus opened the door to
potentially upholding any number of non-remedial interests as
justifications for race-conscious policies.
Second, the Court's reliance on several of the Paradise factors to
evaluate the Law School admissions policy indicates that the Court has
moved toward a single test-or at least a set of closely aligned
inquiries-for narrow tailoring. Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke
focused largely on the flexibility of a policy and the prohibition of
quotas and separate admissions tracks. 57  However, the Court further
elaborated on the Paradise factors by adding inquiries into such factors
as race-neutral alternatives, 58 third-party burdens,59 and time limits. 60
Third, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the context of a given
case affects the strict scrutiny analysis, stating: "[C]ontext matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause." 61  Drawing on the Adarand Court's command that strict
scrutiny shall take "'relevant differences' into account," 62 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter noted that "[n]ot every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decision-maker for the use of race in that particular
context."
63
2. The Grutter Court's Contextual Scrutiny
While the Court stated that its analysis in Grutter was "no less strict
for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that
lies primarily within the expertise of the University," 64 the Court's
review of the Law School admission policy was more relaxed than its
strict scrutiny analyses in prior cases. The Court's assessment of the
compelling interest requirement was especially deferential.
Recognizing the Court's history of yielding to academic decision
56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (stating that "we have never held that the only governmental use
of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination").
57. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
58. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
59. Id. at 341.
60. Id. at 343.
61. Id. at 327.
62. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 328.
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making because of the freedoms grounded in the First Amendment,
65
Justice O'Connor stated, "[t]he Law School's educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer .... Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving
a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits." 66  The Grutter Court went on to
conclude that the interest in attaining a diverse student body is
sufficiently important and genuine and lies "at the heart of the Law
School's proper institutional mission."67
The Court's compelling interest analysis was specifically deferential
in its consideration of the Law School's evidentiary burden justifying its
diversity interest. Although the Court discussed the University's
extensive evidence of the educational benefits of diversity, as well as
arguments and studies contained in the amicus curiae briefs in support
of the University, the Court did not impose the "strong basis in
evidence" standard that has been mandated in remedial affirmative
action cases.68  Indeed, the Court imposed no formal evidentiary
requirement at all. Instead, the Court ruled that "'good faith' on the part
of a University is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary.'
69
In addition, the Grutter Court held that the narrow tailoring inquiry
"must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to
achieve student body diversity in public higher education. '"70 The Court
grafted core elements of the Paradise inquiry onto Justice Powell's
65. Id. at 328-29 (citing Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225
(1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
66. Id. at 328. The Court further stated: "We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."
Id. at 329.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 330-32. The court further stated that "[iun addition to the expert studies and reports
entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes
learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and
society, and better prepares them as professionals."' Id. at 370 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae
American Educational Research Association et al., at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
69. Id. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319). Similarly, Justice Powell stated in his Bakke
opinion:
"[A] court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence of
a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34.
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Bakke prohibition on quotas and set-asides to impose a narrow tailoring
test focused on the individualized consideration of applicants and the
flexible use of race.7 ' Although the dissent in Grutter accused the
majority of skirting the narrow tailoring mandates, the Court's analysis
is not as openly deferential as that of its compelling interest analysis.
For instance, the dissenting opinions of both Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for upholding the Law
School's process of achieving a critical mass of minority students in an
effort to achieve a racial balance.72  Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion addressed this concern not by conceding a deferential standard
of narrow tailoring but by arguing that a selective admissions process
with specific target goals does not constitute racial balancing at all,
emphasized in Grutter by the evidence of wide variations in annual
enrollment statistics for minority students. 73
Nonetheless, one element of narrow tailoring that both the Grutter
majority and the dissent recognized as a departure from the traditional
analysis-excessively deferential in the eyes of the dissent, merely
contextual in the eyes of the majority-was the durational requirement
for narrow tailoring. Justice Powell imposed no time limits on
admissions policies in Bakke, but the Grutter Court, drawing on the
Paradise factors, imposed the following requirement specific to
colleges and universities: "In the context of higher education, the
durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-
conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body
71. The Court did not impose any requirements related to the inclusiveness of the policy, as it
had imposed in Adarand. Inclusiveness has direct relevance in the evaluation of a remedial
policy because it ensures that the remedy closely fits the injury suffered by particular racial
groups, but when applied to a non-remedial admissions policy, inclusiveness may have less
salience because race is tied, not to a remedy, but to a broader process in which it can be
considered as one of several factors. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
506 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing problems of remedial inclusiveness); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing the same).
Still, inclusiveness can be a problem in a non-remedial policy if the policy fails to consider race
in the applications of individuals whose race ought to be considered because doing so would
advance the university's diversity interest.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 387-95 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The Court has made clear that racial balancing-namely seeking specific numbers or
percentages of racial minorities within an institution simply to achieve some form of proportional
representation-is not, in and of itself, a compelling interest. See id. at 329-30.
73. Id. at 336. The weakness in Justice O'Connor's reply is that enrollment statistics, while
reflective of admissions goals, can be less indicative of admission processes than admitted student
statistics, because enrollment figures introduce factors outside the control of the admissions
process, namely student decision making on whether to attend the university after being admitted.
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diversity. 74  The Grutter majority further acknowledged that it was
presuming the University's good faith in regularly reviewing its
admissions policy and considering alternatives in stating: "We take the
Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable." 75 In his dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the majority's discussion of time limits to
be the "vaguest of assurances" and concluded that a critical element of
strict scrutiny had been "casually subverted. '76 Regardless, the Grutter
Court's recognition of a "relevant difference" in the context of a
university admissions policy meant that the Law School did not have to
impose a fixed end date on its policy.
77
3. Grutter's Effects on Strict Scrutiny Analysis
The Court's analysis in Grutter implies that institutions of higher
learning, at least when making decisions traditionally protected by the
First Amendment, will enjoy significant deference in advancing
academic interests when carefully crafting race-conscious policies. For
instance, courts may defer to the academic judgments of educators who
choose to advance a faculty diversity interest because faculty selection
decisions-and the related effects on teaching, curriculum development,
and research-are central to the basic missions of universities, as well
as because the benefits of faculty diversity can be expected to parallel
the benefits of student body diversity.78 Moreover, courts may grant
more latitude to institutions in setting target goals and flexible time
limits in faculty hiring because of the narrow tailoring guidelines in
Grutter.
79
Yet, notwithstanding its implications for higher education, Grutter
leaves unaddressed several questions regarding the context and the
calibration of strict scrutiny analysis. Should universities be granted the
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id. at 343.
76. Id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 343 (arguing that the Law School should be given latitude to terminate the
program as soon as the administration feels it is practicable).
78. See Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730, 735 (Nev. 1997) (stating
that "the desirability of a racially diverse faculty [is] sufficiently analogous to the constitutionally
permissible attainment of a racially diverse student body"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998).
79. Deference in narrow tailoring is certainly not absolute, however, both Grutter and Gratz
imposed limits on the range of admissions policies that are constitutionally permissible, and one
would expect that a faculty hiring process that is not flexible and that employs race in a heavily
weighted and overly mechanical way would encounter the same problems as the undergraduate
admissions policy struck down in Gratz.
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same level of deference for all of their decisions, including employment
and other decisions that involve those individuals or businesses that are
not engaged in academic functions? Should elementary and secondary
school districts that employ race-conscious diversity plans be granted
the same level of deference as institutions of higher education? What
other institutions, if any, are entitled to the same degree of deference as
colleges and universities?
If the Court's strict scrutiny analysis in Grutter is not specific to
higher education admissions, then the Court will need to address the
following questions, among others, in order to maintain the stability of
its strict scrutiny jurisprudence. Does the government's evidentiary
burden for demonstrating a compelling interest change depending on its
context? What evidentiary standards, if any, fall between the "strong
basis in evidence" test required in remedial cases and the deferential
good-faith standard described in Grutter? How should courts determine
when an element of narrow tailoring should be modified within a given
context? Are time limits the only element that may be adjusted, or can
other narrow tailoring elements vary according to context?
Courts may employ contextual analysis on a case-by-case basis;
however, given the history of the federal courts' review of cases
involving racial classifications, it is likely that courts will turn to several
pre-Grutter cases and principles to develop a contextual strict scrutiny
jurisprudence. The following Part explores some of the analyses in
which courts have adjusted strict scrutiny based on context.
1II. CONTEXTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
The Adarand Court's directive that all racial classifications should be
subject to strict scrutiny is designed to maintain symmetry across
different levels of government and a wide range of policies. Grutter,
however, appears to introduce a new element of instability into this
symmetry by allowing context to affect strict scrutiny. But contextual
analysis is not an entirely new development in equal protection
jurisprudence. 80  Courts have engaged in considerably more fluid
analyses of group classifications, and there have been significant
exceptions to the standard script of strict scrutiny. Indeed, courts began
applying deferential standards of review well before challenges to
affirmative action appeared on recent Supreme Court dockets. 81
80. See infra Part III.A (discussing certain categories of legislation in which courts have not
applied strict scrutiny although the legislation involves a consideration of race).
81. Id.
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Many of the federal courts' techniques for reviewing racial
classifications can be divided into core variations, including the
following: (1) categorically excluding race-based classifications from
heightened review; (2) establishing separate triggers for strict scrutiny,
such as the "predominant factor" test in legislative districting; and (3)
employing distinctive forms of strict scrutiny itself, including
deferential versions found in cases involving military necessity and in
higher education admissions. Each of these variations is discussed
below.
A. Categorical Deference
Although the Supreme Court's consistency and congruence principles
ostensibly dictate that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny, longstanding traditions of deference in other areas of
constitutional law suggest that such principles are not truly universal.
In areas where the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress
exercises plenary power over certain matters, the Court has fully
deferred to Congress or has applied a lower standard of review and
upheld race-based classifications. In the area of immigration policy, for
example, courts have upheld immigration laws that differentiate on the
basis of race or national origin, dating back to the Chinese exclusion
laws of the late nineteenth century, because of judicial deference to
congressional and executive power over sovereignty and the regulation
of entry into the United States. 82 Deference in the immigration field has
been so broad that courts barely engage in rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause, let alone apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Similarly, in the arena of public policies affecting Native Americans,
the Supreme Court has recognized congressional plenary powers and
has treated laws that differentiate on the basis of Native American
status, not as race- or ancestry-based classifications, but as political
classifications arising from the unique relationship between Native
American tribes and the federal government. In Morton v. Mancari, the
Court recognized the extensive powers of Congress over tribal affairs
and upheld an employment preference that favored qualified Native
82. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (holding that it is the power
of every sovereign nation to forbid the immigration of foreigners, or to admit them only "upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
609 (1889) (holding that Congress has the power to control our borders). See generally Gabriel J.
Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that racial classifications used in immigration
are deeply at odds with the contemporary mores).
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Americans for employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 83 Because
of the special relationship between Congress and the Native American
tribes, the Court ruled that heightened review was inappropriate and
concluded that the employment criterion was a legitimate means of
furthering the cause of tribal self-governance, thereby making the
Bureau of Indian Affairs more responsive to the needs of its constituent
groups. 84
In addition to areas involving congressional plenary powers,
categorical deference has also appeared in judicial review of state and
local laws. For example, the Ninth Circuit has recently ruled that racial
classifications in the area of state prison administration are categorically
excluded from strict scrutiny review. In Johnson v. California,85 a case
in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 2004, the Ninth
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a California prison policy that
temporarily segregated prisoners by race and ethnicity in assigning cell
mates. Relying on Supreme Court precedent in which the Court
sanctioned a deferential approach to evaluating constitutional challenges
to prison regulations, 86 the Ninth Circuit ruled that California officials
were entitled to significant deference in the conduct of prison affairs
and that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for analyzing
this policy. 87  Under the lower standard, the court upheld the
segregation policy as a legitimate measure that was reasonably related
to the state's penal interest in preventing inter-prisoner racial violence. 88
The Ninth Circuit did not attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court's
prison administration line of cases from the holdings of Adarand and
Croson, and as such, the Supreme Court's approval of such a broad
exception to Adarand's consistency principle could be problematic.
Nonetheless, even if the Court were to decide that there should be no
exception to strict scrutiny for prison policies, the application of a
contextual strict scrutiny analysis granting deference to prison officials
may lead the Court to reach the same conclusion, thereby upholding the
temporary segregation policies as constitutional.
Categorical deference for racial classifications is unusual and limited,
but it suggests that courts may be willing to disregard or loosen the
83. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (holding that the federal government can
establish preferences in employment for those of Native American ancestry).
84. Id. at 554-55.
85. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1505 (2004).
86. Id. at 798-99 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), for the proposition that the
deferential test is to be applied when assessing prisoners' constitutional rights).
87. Id. at 798-99, 803.
88. Id. at 807.
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Adarand mandates in areas in which the judiciary historically has been
deferential, such as when Congress acts in an area over which it has
special and extraordinary powers, or when courts are reluctant to tread
in certain areas of law because of the highly specialized expertise of
other branches of government.
B. Triggering Strict Scrutiny
The University of Michigan cases confirm that in the context of
university admissions, courts employ strict scrutiny even if race is only
one among several factors under consideration. Although strict scrutiny
is typically invoked whenever a classification is based at least in part on
race, federal courts have adopted different triggers for their analyses
based on the type of policy involved. In the area of race-conscious
legislative districting, the Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny is
not triggered unless race is the predominant factor in the creation of
"majority-minority" districts designed to maintain the voting power of
minority voters. In other cases, the form of a policy has dictated the
applicability of strict scrutiny, and a number of courts have held that
when policies do not subject individuals to unequal treatment-as in the
case of minority-targeted outreach programs that increase opportunities
for minorities-strict scrutiny is not triggered.
1. Race-Conscious Legislative Districting
In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Georgia districting plan creating two black-
majority congressional districts that were designed to concentrate
minority voting power. 89 The Court struck down the plans after
applying strict scrutiny. In doing so, Justice Kennedy concluded in his
majority opinion that examining racial demographics is all but
inevitable in legislative districting and that not every use of race
requires courts to invoke strict scrutiny. 9° Indeed, in order to avoid
diluting minority voting power and to comply with the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, redistricting bodies must consider race and may have to
create majority-minority districts to prevent a violation of the Act.
Therefore, plaintiffs in constitutional challenges to districting plans
must demonstrate that:
[R]ace was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district ... [and] must prove that the legislature
89. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-28 (1995).
90. Id. at 913.
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subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including
but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to
racial considerations.
91
Once strict scrutiny is triggered, however, the analysis in districting
cases parallels the review in other race cases. For example, in Miller
itself, the Court ruled that race was a predominant factor in the state's
districting decisions and therefore applied strict scrutiny.92 The Court
went on to conclude that the State lacked a strong basis in evidence to
support its interest in remedying past discrimination, and further, the
Court held that no deference should be granted to the U.S. Department
of Justice's determination that the district lines were necessary to
comply with the Voting Rights Act.93 Miller thus implies that without a
strong factual predicate to show that majority-minority districts are
needed to advance a remedial interest or to prevent a violation of the
Voting Rights Act, line drawing in which race is the predominant factor
is likely to be unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also confirmed that when race
does not predominate as a factor in districting, strict scrutiny should not
be invoked. In Easley v. Cromartie,94 the Court held that race was not
the predominant factor in the creation of a North Carolina majority-
minority congressional district and that strict scrutiny was not triggered
because the Court found that race highly correlated with political party
affiliation and the State's legislative lines were drawn primarily for
political rather than racial purposes 9
5
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate other settings in which racial
predominance is a prerequisite to triggering strict scrutiny, but the
Court's recent redistricting decisions imply that when race is a
predictable and central consideration in a multi-factor decision-making
process-and especially when race must be considered to comply with a
constitutional or statutory mandate-then a predominance test may be
more appropriate than a per se rule that automatically triggers strict
scrutiny whenever race is a factor among many considered in the
development of a policy.
The Supreme Court neglected this level of analysis altogether in its
University of Michigan decisions, where it automatically applied strict
91. Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 920.
93. Id. at 920-21.
94. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
95. Id. at 243-44, 248.
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scrutiny to the University's race-conscious admissions policies, even
though race was only one of several factors considered in each of the
challenged admissions policies. The Court could have drawn parallels
between redistricting and admissions to avoid reaching the strict
scrutiny question, particularly in the Grutter case, where race was held
not to be a predominant factor in admissions. Like redistricting bodies,
colleges and universities monitor the overall racial composition of their
student bodies, and universities must also comply with statutory and
regulatory mandates under federal law such as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination by recipients
of federal funding.96 On the other hand, even if it had addressed the
triggering question in the Michigan cases, the Court might have
distinguished districting from affirmative action because districting does
not involve a competitive process-no one is deprived of the basic right
to vote in redistricting, compared to an applicant who may be denied a
slot in a university program-or because districting might be sui generis
and an exception to the Court's more general triggering rules. Whether
the Court will apply the predominant factor trigger in other types of
cases may ultimately turn on whether a race-conscious policy is
sufficiently analogous to legislative districting so that racial
considerations are an inevitable element of a legislative process, but
could violate equal protection if they predominate over other factors.
2. The Unequal Treatment Trigger
Another line of cases involving triggering for strict scrutiny has
distinguished those policies which result in unequal treatment because
of race and those which do not. The form of the policy is the central
inquiry, and several courts have upheld policies that provide greater
opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities but do not impose
differential benefits and burdens on the basis of race; in essence, the
policies do not result in any unequal treatment that would trigger strict
scrutiny. In cases involving minority-targeted outreach and recruitment
programs designed to increase the pool of applicants for a limited
number of positions, courts have upheld programs involving student
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000 & West Supp. 2004) (stating that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing The Spring:
Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1569, 1598-1602 (2002) (arguing that by targeting only intentional discrimination, strict scrutiny
fails groups that it was intended to protect).
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enrollment 97  and faculty hiring in higher education,98  housing
opportunities, 99 and government employment.' °
For example, in Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education, a case
involving affirmative action in faculty hiring, the district court indicated
that inclusive programs do not trigger strict scrutiny because their
purpose is to ensure that the pool of candidates is as large as possible.
10 1
The court stated: "Recruitment and other techniques of inclusion do not
affect the selection process for hiring or promotion. Rather, inclusive
techniques seek to ensure that as many qualified candidates as possible
make it to the selection process."' 10 2 As long as recruitment increases the
pool of applicants and does not exclude non-minority applicants, strict
scrutiny is not triggered. 103 On the other hand, exclusive programs that
select some applicants over others may create benefits for minorities
and can also impose undue burdens on non-minorities. 1°4  As the
Shuford court concluded, exclusive programs trigger strict scrutiny
because "selection by necessity requires excluding some people" and
"[lt]he concern is discriminatory exclusion that causes harm to third
parties . "...105
However, not all lower courts have ruled that minority-targeted
outreach programs necessarily escape strict scrutiny. In MD/DCIDE
Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
an FCC policy requiring licensees to engage in race-conscious
recruitment efforts triggered strict scrutiny, even though non-minorities
might still have full access to the application process. 10 6  The court
stated:
[T]he Commission has designed a rule under which nonminorities are
97. See Weser v. Glen, 190 F. Supp. 2d 384, 395-407 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding the validity
of an admissions program that was committed to increasing the diversity of the school).
98. See Honadle v. Univ. of Vt., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 427-29 (D. Vt. 1999) (upholding race-
conscious faculty inducement program as long as the program affects faculty recruitment and not
faculty hiring).
99. See Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that limited preference to
former residents, many of whom were minorities, established by the developer to comply with the
Fair Housing Act, did not violate equal protection because other units could be rented by any
applicant, regardless of race).
100. See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding an outreach
program to recruit more female probation officers).
101. Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535, 1551-52 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
102. Id. at 1551.
103. Id. at 1552 (holding that "techniques of inclusion do not require the traditional Title VII
and equal protection analysis that courts have used for techniques of exclusion").
104. Id. at 1551-52.
105. Id. at 1551.
106. MD/DC/DE Broad. Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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less likely to receive notification of job openings solely because of
their race; that the most qualified applicant from among those
recruited will presumably get the job does not mean that people are
being treated equally-that is, without regard to their race-in the
qualifying round. The new rule is therefore subject to strict scrutiny
for compliance with the constitutional requirement that all citizens
receive equal protection under the law. 107
The District of Columbia Circuit's more mechanical analysis
proposes that even the most incidental benefits and burdens resulting
from the consideration of race in recruitment will cause unequal
treatment and therefore should trigger a strict scrutiny analysis. Such an
approach is considerably more formalistic than the analyses in other
recent cases evaluating minority-targeted programs, and the weight of
authority in the lower courts suggests that the better-reasoned approach
is to invoke strict scrutiny only if a race-conscious policy leads directly
to an identifiable and concrete harm, such as the exclusion of some
applicants because of race. 108
C. Variations of the Standard Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Taking Adarand and Grutter together, the Supreme Court has
employed two distinct models of strict scrutiny analysis in affirmative
action cases: (1) a remedial model in which the government is required
to demonstrate that its interest in remedying past discrimination is
substantiated by "a strong basis in evidence," and that its policy is
narrowly tailored under the Paradise multifactor test; and (2) a
deferential model in which the interest is presumed to be valid based on
governmental good faith, and the constitutionality of the policy rests
primarily on whether it is narrowly tailored (allowing for some degree
of good-faith deference in narrow tailoring). However, the Supreme
Court's pre-Adarand cases, as well as recent lower court cases, indicate
that the landscape is actually more complex and that courts have
employed multiple models of strict scrutiny, including an anti-
subordination model, since the Supreme Court first developed the strict
107. Id.
108. Assuming that strict scrutiny is not triggered by a race-conscious policy, courts have not
provided exact guidance on whether the policy is then subject to rational basis scrutiny or to
intermediate scrutiny. Recent cases suggest that rational basis scrutiny becomes the default
standard of review if strict scrutiny is not invoked, although one lower court has ruled that race-
conscious policies involving elementary and secondary school assignment policies should meet
the intermediate standard of review. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 364-66 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that although the court would apply a strict
scrutiny analysis as briefed by the parties, intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard to apply
in this case).
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scrutiny concept in the 1940s. This Sub-Part will begin by discussing
the pre-Adarand model, and conclude by discussing the two distinct
models employed by Adarand and Grutter.
1. Anti-Subordination Model
The Supreme Court's "strict in theory, fatal in fact" jurisprudence of
the 1960s and 1970s epitomizes the Court's anti-subordination model of
strict scrutiny: Any classification that burdens a racial minority group
and treats the group as inferior is irrational and presumed
unconstitutional. Under this model, courts have rejected the interests
underlying racial classifications as either invalid or pretextual;
moreover, courts have found that racial animus was the true motivation
for the discriminatory legislation and have struck down policies with
little inquiry into the "fit" of the policy advancing the stated interest.
For instance, in striking down anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting
interracial marriages, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia stated,
"[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies [the racial] classification.
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on
their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy."' 10 9 Although overtly subordinating policies have become a
rarity, the basic model is still available to analyze policies whose
motivation is racial animus against any racial group, including
whites. I10
2. Remedial Model
In contemporary litigation, the most commonly employed model of
strict scrutiny has become the remedial model applied to affirmative
action policies and legislative districting plans designed to benefit
minority groups. Under this model, courts have presumed the
importance of remedial interests, at least when confined to remedying
the present effects of past discrimination created by an institution.
However, the evidentiary burdens on the institution are considerable:
An institution must show a strong basis in evidence documenting the
109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
110. Although subordinating policies have historically targeted non-white racial groups, the
more recently articulated "consistency" principle in Adarand appears to extend the anti-
subordination model to include group subordination against any racial group, including whites.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995).
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need for remediation, and each of the elements of the narrow tailoring
analysis outlined in Paradise must be satisfied.11'
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
non-remedial interests outside of the university admissions context, it is
not entirely clear whether the remedial model constitutes the default
model of strict scrutiny which courts must apply whenever they do not
extend significant deference to an institution, as in Grutter v. Bollinger.
Several elements of the remedial model appeared in the Grutter Court's
narrow tailoring analysis, which suggests that the Court may be inclined
to apply most, if not all, of the Paradise factors in non-remedial cases.
Moreover, lower courts that have addressed the constitutionality of non-
remedial interests have required the presentation of significant evidence
to justify the governmental interests. 112  Although the strong basis in
evidence requirement need not be the same standard applied in non-
remedial cases, a substantial evidence requirement that the government
document both the importance of the interest and the genuineness of its
motive would maintain the core skepticism of strict scrutiny.
3. Deferential Models
Although the Adarand Court repudiated the use of a lower standard
of review (i.e., the intermediate level of scrutiny) out of deference to
racial classifications developed by Congress and the federal government
to benefit racial minorities, at least two models of deferential strict
scrutiny may still be available to the Court: the military necessity model
employed in Korematsu v. United States;113  and, the academic
deference model employed in both Bakke and Grutter.1 4
a. National Security and Military Necessity
Recent anti-terrorism policies that endorse forms of racial and ethnic
profiling1 15 raise the possibility that the traditional anti-subordination
111. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 187 (1987) (plurality opinion).
112. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[tlhe concern
and the response, moreover, must be substantiated and not merely asserted").
113. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding a 1942 military order
excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated areas and noting that "we are at war
with the Japanese Empire" and that the "properly constituted military authorities ... decided that
the military urgency of the situation demanded that [these individuals] be segregated from the
West Coast temporarily").
114. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 & n.53 (1978) (holding
that "good faith" will be presumed on the part of a university making individualized admissions
decisions "in which ethnic background plays a part"). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 328 (2003) (holding that "[t]he Law School's educational judgment that such [racial]
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer").
115. See Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September II World,
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model could be invoked in the near future. Nevertheless, the not-so-
strict analysis found in Korematsu,116 the case in which the Supreme
Court first offered strict scrutiny terminology in reviewing and
ultimately upholding the World War II exclusion of Japanese-
Americans, suggests that a deferential model of strict scrutiny might be
employed to analyze racial classifications justified by national security
interests, particularly during wartime.
Widely condemned both for its failure to recognize the racial animus
underlying the exclusion and internment of Japanese-Americans, and
for its loose analysis of the means employed to address the
government's military necessity interest, Korematsu has never been
overruled and contains language that might be invoked for the
proposition that Congress and the executive branch enjoy significant
deference when employing wartime racial classifications. By stating
that it could not "reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authorities and of Congress," 117 and that it could not "say that the war-
making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing
that in a critical hour" 118 the exclusion of Japanese-Americans was
unjustified by military necessity, the Korematsu Court established a
strict-in-theory, but deferential-in-fact threshold for its then-emerging
strict scrutiny standard. Despite the weakness of the government's
evidence of military necessity-later proved to be based on
prosecutorial misconduct and outright deception 1 9-the Court upheld
the racial classification out of deference to the military.
120
The wholesale detention of every member of a racial or ethnic group
in the interest of national security is not a likely scenario today;
however, the deferential standard of Korematsu might still be invoked
to analyze less burdensome policies such as targeted security checks,
certain racial profiling during wartime, or strong anti-terrorism efforts.
While the traditional anti-subordination model is the appropriate model
for analyzing such policies, the national security model still lies, as
Justice Jackson stated in his Korematsu dissent, like "a loaded weapon
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1195-1202 (2003) (discussing the movement toward increased
racial profiling during the period after the September 11 attacks).
116. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id.
119. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that
there is evidence in the record that the government deliberately omitted relevant information).
120. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219, 223-24.
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ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need."'
12 1
b. Academic Deference
The Grutter Court's model of deferential scrutiny contains several
key elements: (1) recognition of decision making rooted in First
Amendment academic freedoms; (2) good faith deference to the
importance and sincerity of an academic institution's compelling
interest; and (3) skepticism with a modest degree of deference in
assessing whether an academic policy is narrowly tailored. The Grutter
Court specifically deferred to the University's good faith review of its
admissions policies as a sufficient limitation on the duration of a race-
conscious policy. 1
22
As a general model of strict scrutiny, however, the Supreme Court's
analysis in Grutter may be difficult to extend beyond academic decision
making and outside of the higher education context because of the key
element of academic freedom under the First Amendment. Universities
often act in multiple roles, including employer and contractor, in which
academic decision making arguably does not inhere. For instance, an
affirmative action plan designed to increase the diversity of the primary
care staff at a university-run hospital may generally advance a
university's goals of research and public service, but may not enjoy the
same level of deference because academic functions are not central to
the roles played by the hospital staff. Similarly, an affirmative action
plan designed to remedy a university's past discrimination in
contracting may invoke a remedial model of strict scrutiny rather than
an academic deference model because many contracting functions-the
construction of buildings and the physical plant, for example-are not
unique to a university and extend beyond its special role as an academic
policy maker.
Parallels between higher education and other governmental
institutions may also be problematic. Courts have granted significant
deference to elementary and secondary schools in areas of constitutional
law that set boundaries on students' rights, including procedural due
process, Fourth Amendment search and seizure, and free speech under
121. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
122. At least one lower court addressing academic decision making has also deferred to a
university's expertise in determining the necessity of its policy and the adequacy of race-neutral
alternatives. See Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1062-63 (9th
Cir. 1999) (upholding race-conscious admissions policy for university-based elementary school
designed to promote university's interest in educational research), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877
(2000).
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the First Amendment. 123 Nevertheless, deference to public schools has
not been rooted in academic freedoms typically ascribed to higher
education, where the free exchange of ideas and viewpoints is highly
valued; indeed, K-12 education is often highly standardized and
regimented, particularly in the lower grade levels. Courts, however,
have recognized that some degree of deference is appropriate in
assessing academic decision making within the purview of school
districts because of their expertise in educational matters and their
detailed knowledge of local conditions. Other institutions outside of the
education area may also enjoy deference because of their specialized
expertise, but the absence of a First Amendment interest, or some other
concurrent constitutional interest, could preclude the same degree of
deference granted to a college or university.
D. Contextual Patterns
Because of the limited number of Supreme Court cases in this area, it
is difficult to discern exact patterns that would dictate the outcomes in
future cases involving racial classifications. Nevertheless, existing case
law suggests that the Court is likely to apply different variations of strict
scrutiny based on contextual factors such as governmental motivation
(e.g., subordinating versus non-subordinating motives, or remedial
versus non-remedial interests), institutional prerogatives and powers
(e.g., Congress's or the military's special powers), institutional
expertise (e.g., academic decision making), governmental role (e.g.,
educator versus contractor), and the type of policy implemented (e.g.,
inclusive versus exclusive). Courts are therefore much less likely to
uphold racial classifications developed by institutions to which they
grant little or no deference, and that are acting out of animosity to
subordinate a racial group. On the other hand, courts are much more
likely to uphold minimally burdensome policies enacted by institutions
that possess special prerogatives and expertise to which courts defer and
that are acting with the clear motivation of assisting racial minority
group members. The outcomes in cases falling between these two
bounds would likely be dictated by the interaction of various contextual
factors and by the specific facts of a case.
The next Part attempts to sort through such key contextual factors
and proposes a model of strict scrutiny that incorporates both triggering
123. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1346-69 (2000) (discussing a secondary student's constitutional rights as to speech, searches, and
sanctions).
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mechanisms and strict scrutiny variants to help guide the analysis of
racial classifications.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTEXTUAL STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
As the foregoing discussion suggests, courts can and should consider
multiple factors in evaluating the context of cases involving racial
classifications. These factors can include government motive,
institutional prerogatives and expertise, governmental role, traditions of
judicial deference, and the nature of the policy itself. Integrating the
various strands of case law in which context has mattered implies a
strict scrutiny framework that first evaluates whether strict scrutiny
should be triggered at all and then applies an appropriate model of
analysis for the compelling interest and narrow tailoring inquiries.
Employing different models of strict scrutiny analysis, ranging from the
highly deferential to the highly skeptical, can properly allocate
evidentiary burdens on a governmental institution and can accord, when
dictated, the appropriate level of deference to an institution's decision
making. The remainder of this Part elaborates on an ideal framework
and applies the framework to a sampling of educational policies.
A. The Contextual Scrutiny Inquiry
Judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a race-conscious policy
should ideally involve a two-step process: (1) a triggering evaluation to
determine whether strict scrutiny is the appropriate analysis or whether
another mode of equal protection analysis, such as a rational basis test,
is warranted; and (2) a strict scrutiny evaluation that allows the court to
employ variations -archetypes -that can allow some degree of judicial
deference, as well as more heightened scrutiny when appropriate, to
accommodate relevant contextual differences.
1. Strict Scrutiny Triggering
Case law involving categorical exclusions and case law involving
legislative districting and minority recruitment suggest that a triggering
inquiry should be a routine first step of strict scrutiny analysis. Many
courts, including the Supreme Court in its University of Michigan
decisions, often elide this inquiry; however, failing to perform a
triggering inquiry could change the outcome of a case and could lead to
improper lines of analysis, such as overweighing race as a factor in a
decision-making process or misallocating the benefits to and burdens on
different racial groups.
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A contextual triggering inquiry might employ three levels of
questioning: (1) is the classification subject to categorical exclusion; (2)
if not, does the policy-making process dictate that race predominate in
order to trigger strict scrutiny; and (3) if not, is race used as a significant
factor in a classification that results in the unequal treatment of a group
or an individual. As discussed in Part III.A, categorical exclusion
applies to those rare exceptions in which courts defer outright to
governmental decision making and should be reserved for
circumstances in which the government possesses extraordinary
prerogatives and powers-and courts have historically deferred to those
prerogatives and powers. A racial predominance test might be imposed
in cases in which policy makers must, as in the legislative districting
context, routinely weigh racial data and other demographic information
in order to create policies that are not only sound and effective but also
comply with anti-discrimination laws' mandates.
If neither the categorical exclusion nor the racial predominance test is
applicable, then a baseline triggering inquiry could focus on whether a
governmental classification employs race as a significant factor and
results in the unequal treatment of a group or an individual because of
race. If race is not a significant factor, it would not have an identifiable
role in causing a constitutional injury. Similarly, unless a policy
actually results in unequal treatment, there would be no injury in need
of redress. Thus, a hiring policy that provides a "plus" for members of
certain racial minority groups and makes a difference in hiring decisions
would trigger strict scrutiny because race is a significant factor in the
process and imposes some burdens (a slightly lower probability of
hiring) on non-minority applicants. However, a minority-targeted
outreach policy that increases the number of minority applicants, while
employing race as a significant factor, would not trigger strict scrutiny
if it does not result in unequal treatment, such as preventing non-
minority applicants from receiving information about a program that
would enable them to apply.
2. Strict Scrutiny Archetypes
Although factoring contextual variables might lead to a large and
potentially unwieldy number of strict scrutiny models, a more
manageable approach is employing a set of archetypes, ranging from a
deferential archetype on one end to a highly skeptical archetype on the
opposite end, with a mid-range archetype that would serve as the default
model for most race-conscious policies. All of the archetypes would
impose the essential strict scrutiny requirements of establishing a
compelling interest and employing a narrowly tailored policy, but
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evidentiary burdens and good-faith deference would vary depending on
which archetype is being employed.
The Supreme Court's current remedial model of strict scrutiny could
form the core of a mid-level archetype. The remedial model imposes a
dual burden on government to demonstrate its compelling interest: (1)
the interest must be sufficiently important as a matter of policy; and (2)
the genuineness of the interest must be documented through a
substantial quantum of evidence, specifically the "strong basis in
evidence" requirement. A core archetype could impose these basic
requirements on non-remedial policies as well. The remedial narrow
tailoring inquiry, drawn largely from United States v. Paradise, could
impose basic requirements of proving necessity, flexibility, time limits,
no undue burdens on third parties, and the non-availability of workable
alternatives. 124
Ratcheting the elements of strict scrutiny analysis up or down to
reach the other archetypes would depend on the weight of various
contextual factors, including governmental motive, institutional
prerogative and role, and a history of judicial deference. A high
skepticism archetype-based essentially on an anti-subordination
model-could be imposed in contexts in which racial animosity
motivates a governmental classification and there are no other factors,
such as a historical deference to institutional expertise, that militate
against a ruling of unconstitutionality. The government's evidentiary
burden for both the compelling interest and narrow tailoring
components of strict scrutiny would be high, but even an extraordinary
quantum of evidence might not overcome the presumption of
unconstitutionality.
A deferential archetype, however, would lower the evidentiary
burden and relax some elements of narrow tailoring because of factors
weighing in favor of judicial deference. A combination of benign
motivations and historical deference to an institution might produce an
inquiry similar to the Grutter Court's analysis, in which there is a
minimal evidentiary burden imposed to demonstrate the institution's
compelling interest, and good faith can be presumed along several
dimensions of narrow tailoring, including time limits, documenting the
necessity of a policy, and considering viable alternative policies.
When several contextual factors are at play and, in effect, cancel each
other, the default model of strict scrutiny can be invoked as the
appropriate level of analysis. For instance, courts may be inclined to
124. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-85 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(discussing the analysis to determine if remedial plans are sufficiently narrowly tailored).
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grant deference to Congress and the executive branch when evaluating
policies that pursue national security interests, but a policy that appears
to be motivated by racial or ethnic animus may lead courts to adopt the
mid-level archetype that grants no deference and requires full
documentation in support of the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring requirements. Similarly, a higher education institution that is
engaging in a remedial affirmative action policy or moving outside its
traditional role as an educator and academic policy maker would not be
extended the same degree of deference as the Grutter Court extended to
the University of Michigan, and would instead be bound by the mid-
level form of strict scrutiny.
B. Application to Educational Policies
To illustrate how this proposed framework might work in practice,
consider the analyses applied to a variety of race-conscious educational
policies, including the drawing of boundaries for school attendance
zones, a selective high school admissions policy, and a voluntary
district-wide racial integration plan.
1. School Assignment Boundaries
An example of a race-conscious K-12 educational policy that might
be screened out by a contextual triggering inquiry is a policy that
employs race in drawing the boundaries for school attendance zones.
Like legislative districting plans, boundaries for school attendance
zones are typically drawn with a school board's knowledge and
consideration of the racial demographics of a district. 125 The school
board might have an underlying goal of preventing racial isolation, as
well as preventing any violation of the Constitution or civil rights laws,
by drawing school attendance boundaries that more evenly distribute
white and minority students across the zones. However, race might not
be the predominant factor considered in the creation of the attendance
zones. Achieving population equality across the districts, ensuring
geographically compact zones, and maintaining socioeconomic balance
among the zones might be equally important factors that are weighed in
tandem with race.
Moreover, even if a court concluded that a racial predominance test
was not applicable to the attendance zone policy, it still might hold that
strict scrutiny should not be triggered because the policy does not result
in unequal treatment based on race. A student may be required to attend
one school versus another, but the educational experience should be
125. See Rubin, supra note 34, at 37-46.
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fungible across zone lines and no student should be deprived of a basic
education within the district. Without an analysis of context through a
triggering inquiry, a court might mechanically apply strict scrutiny to
the policy and therefore fail to address the basic questions of how much
weight the school board gave to race in drawing the attendance zones or
whether the policy actually resulted in unequal treatment because of
race.
2. Selective Admissions
A more extensive strict scrutiny analysis would be needed to assess
the constitutionality of a selective, race-conscious admissions policy at
an elite public high school. 126 Suppose that after performing an initial
triggering inquiry, a court concluded that strict scrutiny should be
applied to the policy because there were no applicable exceptions, race
was a significant factor in admissions, and the policy resulted in the
unequal treatment of non-minority applicants to the school. A court
would then weigh contextual factors to guide its use of a model of strict
scrutiny. Based on an inquiry into the intent and motives underlying the
policy- say, to achieve a more diverse student body at an elite school
that prepares students for entry into four-year colleges-as well as
factors affecting institutional deference, the court would assess whether
the appropriate model should be deferential strict scrutiny or the default
model based on the Supreme Court's remedial cases.
The court may be inclined to employ a deferential model based on a
number of factors: the benign motivation of the school district; the
expertise and role of the school district in deciding who should attend
an elite school; and perhaps even a recognition of a First Amendment
interest because of the college preparatory curriculum of the school as a
parallel to higher education. This is not to say that the policy would
necessarily be constitutional; indeed, even with good faith deference the
court may find that the policy is not narrowly tailored, or it could hold
as a matter of law that a school district's diversity interest differs
significantly from a higher education interest and is not important
enough to justify the use of race as a factor. But the context of the
admissions policy and its parallels with higher education could lead the
court to use a deferential framework comparable to the Grutter analysis.
126. See Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 793-94 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing an example of
a selective admissions policy at an elite public high school).
HeinOnline  -- 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 53 2004-2005
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
3. Voluntary Integration
An example of educational policy that may lead a court to employ the
default version of strict scrutiny is a voluntary racial integration plan. A
typical plan is one in which a school district prohibits the voluntary
transfer of students from one school to another if the percentage of
students of a particular racial or ethnic group either exceeds a maximum
or falls below a minimum at a school. The underlying goal is to prevent
racial isolation or imbalance that can lead to educational harms, or at
least to address the problem of fewer educational benefits arising from
the diversity of the student body. 127
Because race is the predominant factor in approving student transfers,
there would be little question that strict scrutiny would be triggered.
What is less clear, however, is whether a deferential model of strict
scrutiny should necessarily apply. If academic decision making by a
school district is always to be given some degree of deference because
of its expertise and academic role, then a deferential model could be
invoked. However, a court might be inclined to rule that policy-makers
in elementary and secondary school education should not be accorded
the same degree of deference as higher education institutions in
promulgating a district-wide integration plan because of the absence of
First Amendment academic freedoms in the lower grade levels, or
because correcting racial imbalances promotes social rather than purely
academic goals. A court's use of the default strict scrutiny model would
require the school district to provide substantial evidence of the benefits
of racially diverse schools, as well as the harms of segregated schools,
and would require the district to thoroughly document that its policy is
narrowly tailored under the Paradise factors. Again, the ultimate ruling
on the policy's constitutionality may not change because of the more
demanding analysis, but the burdens on the district would certainly be
more onerous.
V. CONCLUSION
With its recent affirmative action rulings, the Supreme Court has
opened the door to a more extensive array of race-conscious policy
making. A more flexible strict scrutiny framework that accommodates
the wider variety of settings, as well as policy-makers, is essential if
127. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 749-52 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding race-conscious voluntary integration plan designed to reduce racial isolation);
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 384-86 (D. Mass. 2003)
(upholding race-conscious voluntary integration plan designed to promote benefits of racial
diversity and to reduce harmful effects of racial isolation).
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courts are to properly evaluate the constitutionality of such policies.
The Supreme Court has provided initial guidance on the importance of
context in strict scrutiny analysis, and as courts begin to address these
new policies, a contextual strict scrutiny framework can offer both
courts and policy makers the appropriate tools to assess their legality.
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